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In 2004 in the London Borough of Haringey,  17-month-old  Peter Connelly was found dead 
in his crib. The child had suffered fractured ribs and a broken back after months of abuse at 
home. His mother, her partner and a lodger were jailed for his death. Peter had been seen 
by health and social services professionals from Haringey Council 60 times in the eight 
months before he died.  
There were two kinds of government responses to this that I shall discuss. First, the Minister 
of Education Ed Balls sacked the Director of Children’s Services in Haringey, Sharon Shoe-
smith, with immediate effect in a live press conference on television. Ms Shoesmith defend-
ed herself and her Services: ‘We should not be put into blame’; it does not produce ‘any-
thing productive’ and obscures ‘the bigger picture’. A BBC news interviewer argued to the 
contrary: If nobody accepts the blame,  ‘…how can we stop this happening again?’  
A second response was that of then Prime Minister Tony Blair (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
Speech, York, 2006). He argued that the government can make children and young people 
more safe by identifying at-risk families and intervening early on behalf of the children in 
those families:  
Let me summarise my argument. I am not talking about...trying to make the state 
raise children, or interfering with normal family life. I am saying that where it is clear, 
as it very often is, at young age, that children are at risk of being brought up in a dys-
functional home where there are multiple problems, say of drug abuse or offending, 
then instead of waiting until the child goes off the rails, we should act early enough, 
with the right help, support and disciplined framework for the family, to prevent it... 
It may be the only way to save them and the wider community from the conse-
quences of inaction.  
According to Blair, “We can predict. We can then...‘intervene’.” 
Both these responses are morally questionable. I do not mean by this that they are wrong 
policies; I mean only just that: that they are morally questionable. Look first at Blair’s. Blair’s 
program is intended to identify at risk-families and offer help. But there is evidence that la-
beling families ‘at risk’ can increase the anxiety of the parent and thereby increase the like-
lihood of abuse or neglect. Also, as other experts report, “Parents who have been through 
the process of child protection investigations and registration are often bruised and stigma-
tized by the experience and wary of accepting the help or support which may follow”. So the 
program may cause harm overall.  
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Also the question of parents’ rights and family autonomy looms. As Elizabeth Brake and 
John Millum (Parenthood and Procreation , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2013) put 
it: “Parents have moral and legal rights regarding their children. They have the liberty to 
make decisions on behalf of their children regarding matters such as diet, schooling, [and] 
association with others”. Also, as others argue, the government acts paternalistically when it 
“aim[s] to take over or control what is properly within the [individual’s] own legitimate do-
main of judgment or action” (Shiffrin 2005 p216). In giving directions to parents the gov-
ernment substitutes its judgment of how to raise their child in place of the parent’s judg-
ment. So all this considered, even if the interventions will produce the predicted benefits, 
there remains a question about whether such interventions are justified.   
As to blame: blame is retributive, it is often vindictive, it attacks the moral character of the 
culprit, not the deed, it vilifies the culprit, and as Gareth Williams explains ‘there is clear ev-
idence from social psychology that blame is frequently – and inappropriately – attributed to 
[the free choices of] individuals in modern Western societies’, tending to ‘overestimate the 
extent to which people’s behavior is due to internal, dispositional factors, and to underesti-
mate the role of situational factors.’ Blaming a person is more than grading them negatively. 
It is, as Jay Wallace  argues, to make them the object of negative emotions – resentment, 
indignation – and subject to adverse treatment – avoidance, reproach, scolding, denuncia-
tion, remonstration, and punishment.  
Sharon Shoesmith was later interviewed by the BBC. She described the effects of her ‘vilifi-
cation’ to the interviewer  
“It was horrific. It was frightening. I was terrified. I had death threats. I was afraid on the 
streets of London. It wasn’t just me and my imagination - the police were advising me that I 
was probably at risk. When people take photographs of you on the trains and on the buses 
and point you out and start to shout ‘that’s that woman’ you’re fearful of where that can 
go.” [See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13570959.] 
 
Here is a case from the US. Psychologist Robert Hare developed a test to identify character-
istics of psychopaths, like lack of empathy, lack of remorse, lack of guilt. One study in which 
the test was administered to prisoners found that those who did not have the characteris-
tics identified by Hare were re-convicted of a crime within 5 years about 20-25% of the time. 
Those who did have the characteristics were re-convicted within 5 years about 80% of the 
time. Once this study was released (in the 1980s), parole boards across the US and Canada 
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began using the test when considering the release of prisoners. In several states parole 
boards are even mandated by law to do so. Because the psychopathy test predicts a high 
rate of recidivism, it is unlikely prisoners with Hare’s characteristics will be paroled, consid-
ering the risk to the public -- and the political risk: if a people with ‘known’ psychopathic 
characteristics re-offend, the parole board is in trouble. So there is little incentive for parole 
board to release those with Hare’s characteristics from prison.   
Yet many moral and religious points of view would think that people should not be kept in 
prison because of predictions about their future behavior. Prison is for people who have 
committed crimes (in the past-tense). Those up for parole have already served the minimum 
sentence for their crime. Yet for those prisoners with Hare’s characteristics,  other consider-
ations favoring their release on parole are overridden by the results associating those char-
acteristics with a high recidivism rate.  
Here is yet another example reported last winter recently on the front page of the NY Times. 
In an effort to cut down on robbery, the New York City Police are aggressively intervening in 
the lives of young people. As they describe it, they aim to ‘make them radioactive’ and thus 
isolate them from their friends. Which young people?  - Those ‘destined for trouble’ and 
‘most likely to commit’ these crimes. 
So we have a number of policy responses – Ed Ball’s and Tony Blair’s reactions to the death 
of Peter Connelly; a ‘psychopath’ test to refuse parole; and the NYPD’s targeting of ‘types of 
teenagers destined for trouble’ - all of which are morally questionable; and all of which offer 
promise to succeed, promise based on what we can claim to know. Now, a good policy deci-
sion always requires a mix of considerations: who benefits? who suffers?  who pays? how 
much? what are possible good side effects? bad ones? will the effects last? Etc. Central 
among these are issues of effectiveness and issues of legitimacy: Will the policy achieve the 
desired ends? And, is it morally, politically, culturally acceptable? Few policies will be all to 
the good for all concerned; few have only a moral upside and no moral downside. So it is 
inevitable that a balance be struck. In particular it can be perfectly acceptable to adopt a 
policy that is morally questionable or that has morally negative aspects if we can be sure it 
will achieve good ends, so long as the balance is reasonable and we operate within a range 
of what is at least morally permissible.  
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My concern is with cases where we get the balance wrong because we are overconfident in 
our predictions about what the policy results will be. This in turn generates concerns about 
the current drive for evidence-based policy (EBP) which is advocated, indeed often mandat-
ed, across the policy domains, from medicine to education to crime to economic develop-
ment. Of course in general we will get more reliable predictions about policy outcomes if we 
take into account the evidence than if we ignore it. But there is the promise – or perhaps 
just the hope – of far more certainty than the evidence can deliver. The danger of these mis-
takes is that they encourage an unjustified degree of optimism about how effective our poli-
cies can be, in which case we are likely to get policy deliberation wrong in the delicate bal-
ance between considerations of effectiveness and considerations of legitimacy.  
Here then is the basic problem I want to underscore: Morals and methods ought to mix 
when it comes to policy deliberation. That’s because---leaving costs aside---whether a par-
ticular policy should be implemented depends on whether  
(1) The policy will be effective, i.e. it will produce the expected effects,  
and on whether  
 (2) The policy is morally, socially, politically, culturally acceptable.  
But they don’t always mix in the way they should, because we often focus on (1) and dis-
count the importance of (2). A plausible explanation for this is that we think we have meth-
ods which will provide us with objective and fairly certain answers to the effectiveness ques-
tion, e.g. randomized controlled trials -- RCTs. By contrast, we do not have methods that can 
give us objective and certain answers to the moral question; here, things are much muddier 
and open to debate.   
 
This slide from  
 A: The methods we have for ascertaining (1) are better than the ones we have for 
 ascertaining (2)  
to  
 B: We should give (1) more weight than (2) in policy deliberations  
 is eased along by the prestige that evidence-based policy (EBP) enjoys. The point of EBP is 
to ensure that effectiveness predictions are based on sound evidence. But the expectations 
EBP creates can lead us to give this evidence and the predictions it supports greater weight 
than concerns of moral acceptability. Effectiveness can become the cardinal value in policy 
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deliberations, as I think we are now seeing in UK political calls for coercive interventions into 
families that seriously changes the state-family relationship.   
What I want to do in the rest of this talk is to hack away some mistaken philosophical stanc-
es that can make effectiveness considerations loom larger than they should. These involve a 
circle of mistaken ideas about objectivity, certainty,  and causality: 
 
 
There are three mutually supporting stances: 
4. We bank on certainty. 
5. We suppose objectivity is the path to certainty.  
Objectivity = elimination of the subject, especially judgment; the use of 
methods that have manuals that fix correct procedures. 
6. We assume that causality is ‘linear’ and that it is God given. 
EBP champions objectivity and certainty in social policy deliberation. It insists that, for policy 
evaluation and prediction, we rely only on ‘objective’ methods like randomized controlled 
trials (RCTs) that can provide certainty: in the ideal RCTs can clinch causal claims – and they 
can so without the intrusion of ‘subjective judgment’. From this position we slide easily into 
our third problematic assumption, that causality is linear and God given. 
Look at linearity first. The slide is easy here -- and easy not to notice. That’s because, looking 
through the lens of RCTs, complex causal webs get projected onto a line. Here is a picture of 
the causal process as RCTs tell it:  
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There are two different senses of ‘linear’ involved in this image, and we tend to suppose 
both. 
1 – There is no single sufficient cause. 
What we label ‘the cause’ – the policy whose results we aim to predict or the actions we 
want to blame for some disastrous outcome – is seldom enough on its own to produce the 
effect in question. It needs help. Generally a whole team of support factors must act to-
gether with the highlighted cause or no contribution to the effect will be produced. Epide-
miologists illustrate this with what they call ‘causal pie diagrams’. Here is an example based 
on work on the effectiveness of homework by Harris Cooper.  
Homework is one condition contributing to higher test scores. Other conditions are neces-
sary to ensure that homework is maximally effective. These other conditions include student 
motivation, student ability, access to a proper study space, supportive family, getting a con-
sistent message from teachers and parents, receiving teacher feedback on assignments. 
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I refer to these not as causal pies but as causal pancakes. To make pancakes you need: flour, 
milk, eggs, and baking powder; and you need them all if you are to get a pancake at all.  
With just 3 of the 4 ingredients, you don’t get ¾ of a pancake – you don’t get a pancake at 
all. Similarly for the ingredients in the causal cake diagrams:  all the ingredients are required 
together or you not get the expected level of effect at all. 
The cake diagrams make vivid a crucial point. But they also make it look too simple. For 
most policies the connection between cause and effect is not immediate: there is a long 
chain of steps in between; each one has to occur at the appropriate time to lead on the 
next. Consider this diagram for the Nurse Family Partnership.  
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Already this picture is more complicated than my simple domino image since the policy ini-
tiates not just a single causal chain but 3 different policy actions that lead by interwoven 
chains of intermediate effects to the targeted outcomes – less child abuse and fewer young 
people arrested. 
Focus on the bottom line,  which looks like a straightforward linear sequence. To describe it 
thus is to miss the point about support factors and causal cakes: what we picture as ‘the 
cause’ typically cannot produce the effect on its own but needs the help of a whole team of 
support factors. That’s going to be true for each step in this causal sequence. There’s not 
just one causal cake here but a different causal cake for each step. 
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If we want to identify the support team necessary for the initial NFP causes to produce the 
targeted outcomes, we have to gather all the members of all the support teams from each 
stage and graph them together in one huge causal cake.  
Recall: the point about causal cakes is that all their ingredients have to be in place or you 
don’t get the effect.  To the extent that any of the necessary ingredients is uncertain, so too 
is the final outcome. But – look at our circle of problems. We bargain for certainty. The sim-
ple linear causal model makes this look a far better bargain than it generally is. So: 
 
1.We often expect results that can’t be achieved, which leads to wasted money 
and effort and to heartbreak and dashed hopes;  
2.we don’t work to put in place the support factors that can help make our 
policies work because we haven’t noticed the need for them; 
3.we blame perfectly good policies for failing that could achieve better results in 
better circumstances; and 
4.we despair of doing anything because we cannot find the miracle cure-all. 
The linear model and the omission of support  factors also predisposes us to focus efforts on 
eliminating harmful causes at the head of a sequence, like family drug and alcohol abuse, 
which can be a tall order. But it can be just as effective to remove support factors anywhere 
along the causal path. Consider the growing body of research on resilience factors. ‘Resili-
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ence’ describes the product of a combination of mechanisms for coping in the face of adver-
sity. Evidence from longitudinal studies suggests that many children can recover from short-
lived childhood adversities with little detectable impact in adult life. Encouraging resilience 
is important because resilient children are better equipped to resist stress and adversity, to 
cope with change and uncertainty, and to recover faster and more completely from trau-
matic events or episodes. 
Linear Models Ignore Cycles 
Linear models don’t have cycles in them. But cycles can matter. Consider the UK’s recent 
Munro Review of Child Protection. The Review notes that policies, even good ones, can fig-
ure in negative cakes, alongside positive ones. The negative cakes diminish the good effects 
of the policy, and can even, if they are strong enough, outweigh the good effects. This is just 
the trouble that the Munro Review pinpoints for one of the big UK child welfare policies.  
The policy was intended to improve welfare outcomes in children and young people (that’s 
what ‘CYP’ means in the graph) by providing stricter guidelines for what social workers must 
do in dealing with children and families and by better monitoring of what they are doing: by 
ensuring that specific mandated facts about the family and the child are ascertained and 
recorded properly and that all required meetings take place. But this policy, the Review ar-
gues, can have serious negative effects alongside the intended positive ones. How so? 
Through various negative feedback loops. Have a look at this diagram from the Review: 
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Two negative loops are pictured, R1 and R2. Both start in the same way. Increasing the 
amount of prescription imposed on social workers, you can reduce their sense of satisfac-
tion and self-esteem. In R1, this increases staff sickness and absence rates; in R2, it increases 
staff turnover rates. Both these effects tend to result in an increase in average social worker 
caseload, which leads to social workers spending less time with the children and young peo-
ple and their families. This in turn reduces the quality of the social workers’ relationships 
with the children and their families, which then reduces the quality of the outcomes. So the 
policy may produce bad unintended consequences. Worse, these negative effects can be-
come amplified via the feedback loops. When the outcomes are regularly too unsatisfactory, 
this reduces social workers’ sense of self-esteem and personal responsibility, and the nega-
tive cycle is set in motion again. 
God-Given Causality 
Besides the habit of taking causality as linear, we take it to be God given. But the kinds of 
causal principles we rely on for policy prediction are not God given. They depend on intri-
cate underlying structures. And our focus on objectivity and certainty takes or attention 
away from these underlying structures.  
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To make this point vivid I use an example not from social policy but from my own daily poli-
cies. I often write my lectures on paper and with a sharp pencil. I sharpen my pencils by put-
ting a kite out my study window. I can do that because my study was designed by Rube 
Goldberg. 
 
  
Putting a kite out the window is a very effective policy for me to get nice sharp pencils. Still, 
I don’t advise you to fly a kite to sharpen your pencils. Kite flying undoubtedly figures in the 
causal principles that govern pencil sharpening in my study. It would, for instance, pass any 
rigorous RCT. Put the kite out the window on randomly chosen days and you will certainly 
get more sharp pencils when you put it out than when you don’t. But that principle is local. 
It depends on the underlying structure of my study. The causal role played by kite flying in 
my study is not God given: it depends on a complex pattern of interactions in an intricate 
underlying structure.  
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Of course mine is not a typical social policy case. Social policies suppose principles like 
‘Burnout causes turnover in child welfare service workers’, or ‘Age does not.’ Or ‘Apathetic-
futile mothers are more likely to maltreat their children.’  These are clearly not God-given 
either. And surely it is implausible to suppose that getting a good social regularity, as these 
are purported to be, depends less on the details of the underlying structure than getting 
regularities between pure physical quantities. 
Note too that I am not supposing that there are no human universals, that people in Bang-
ladesh villages are essentially different from those in New York high rises, nor across the 300 
language groups and more than 50 non-indigenous communities who live in London.  In fact 
my Rube Goldberg example of a local causal principle works in just the opposite way, by re-
lying on other causal principles that hold widely. The pencil sharpener depends on a number 
of fairly universal principles – from the laws of the lever and the pulley to the familiar fact 
that moths eat flannel –to ensure that the arrangement and interaction of the components 
results in the causal principle I use to sharpen my pencils. So the fact, if it is one, that there 
are a large number of universal truths about human behaviours, emotions and reactions 
goes no way to showing that the kinds of causal principles we rely on in typical social poli-
cies will be anything other than very local. 
Our aspirations for certainty divert our attention to these kinds of local causal principles 
since they are ones that we can nail down with objective methods, like RCTs: ‘Flying kites in 
NC’s study sharpens pencils’; or from J-PAL, the MIT-based Jameel Poverty Action Lab, after 
a study in certain Indian villages: ‘Informing villagers of poor teaching in their villages and 
raising awareness of accountability mechanisms had no impact on teacher attendance.’  Our 
efforts are taken away from the more difficult study of the underlying structures that make 
these casual principles possible.  
 
When it comes not to prediction but to evaluation – looking back to see what was responsi-
ble for an outcome, the focus on linear causal principles, with their objective certifying 
methods, leads to  skewed views about human error and individual responsibility. As Eileen 
Munro of the Munro Review explains elsewhere (Improving practice : child protection as a 
systems approach, Child and Youth Services Review 2004)  , when a tragedy like the death of 
Peter Connelly occurs, ‘The standard response is to hold an inquiry, looking in detail at the 
case and trying to get a picture of the causal sequence of events that ended in the child’s 
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death…We are tracing a chain of events back in time to understand how it happened.…’ 
More: ‘Unlike the police investigation, which focuses on the perpetrators of the homicide, 
these inquiries focus primarily on how the professionals acted, judging them against the 
formal procedures for working with families and principles of good practice.’  
Where does this backwards tracing stop? As Munro argues, the ‘events that bring the inves-
tigation to a halt usually take the form of human error. Practitioners did not comply with 
procedures or lapsed from accepted standards of good practice.’ But as the UK Dept of 
Health pamphlet explains, ‘There are two ways of viewing human error: the person-centred 
approach and the system approach. The [person-centred] … approach focuses on the psy-
chological precursors of error, such as inattention, forgetfulness and carelessness. Its asso-
ciated countermeasures are aimed at individuals rather than situations and these invariably 
fall within the "control" paradigm of management. Such controls include disciplinary 
measures, writing more procedures to guide individual behaviour, or blaming, naming and 
shaming’ – as we saw at the start in the case of Peter Connelly with Ed Balls and the first 
BBC interviewer.  
But as the UK Dept of Health notes: 
Aside from treating errors as moral issues, [the person-centred approach] isolates 
unsafe acts from their context, thus making it very hard to uncover and eliminate re-
current error traps within the system… 
The system approach, in contrast, takes a holistic stance on the issues of failure. It 
recognises that many of the problems facing organisations are complex, ill-defined 
and result from the interaction of a number of factors. 
Just as in my Rube Goldberg pencil sharpener! 
The same worry is studied in the US National Academy of Sciences’ To Err Is Human: Build-
ing a Safer Health System:  
The title of this report encapsulates its purpose. Human beings, in all lines of work, 
make errors. Errors can be prevented by designing systems that make it hard for 
people to do the wrong thing and easy for people to do the right thing. Cars are de-
signed so that drivers cannot start them while in reverse because that prevents acci-
dents. Work schedules for pilots are designed so they don’t fly too many consecutive 
hours without rest because alertness and performance are compromised. 
The NAS report urges:  
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‘The focus must shift from blaming individuals for past errors to a focus on preventing fu-
ture errors by designing safety into the system.’ Or, to put it in the terms I have been using, 
we should be less concerned with the easier to certify causal sequences that start with hu-
man error and end with disastrous consequences and far more with understanding – and 
restructuring – the underlying structures that make this kind of causal sequence likely. As 
Eileen Munro notes: 
When society is shocked and outraged by a child’s terrible tale of suffering, there 
seems a basic human desire to find a culprit, someone to bear the guilt for the disas-
ter and to be the target of feelings of rage and frustration.  
This puts us squarely in the business of finding these local linear causal principles; and, with 
Tony Blair, we can feel morally and epistemically safe in doing so – we are not likely to cast 
blame in the wrong places – because these are the kinds of claims about which with due 
care our objective methods can deliver reasonable certainty.  But the kinds of preventative 
measures this leads to – recall the Dept of Health examples: disciplinary actions, writing 
more procedures to guide individual behaviour, or blaming, naming and shaming – these 
measures are often unlikely to stop these kinds of sequences occurring.   As Munro urges: 
‘Child protection is a systems problem’.   
And so too are a good many other social problems, from poor childhood nutrition in Bangla-
desh and poor school attendance by teachers in Indian villages to crime, education, health 
and climate change adaptation almost anywhere. Our thirst for certainty and our admiration 
for methods that can be run by rules must not lead us to buy cheap knowledge that can’t 
serve our needs.  
For a timely illustration of linear causal thinking in child protection consider the Serious Case 
Review into the death of Daniel Pelka, a 4-year-old who died at the hands of his mother and 
stepfather in March 2012 in Coventry. His death provoked a massive outcry across the UK in 
large part because, according to the Serious Case Review (SCR) commissioned by the Coven-
try Children Safeguarding Board, the social workers (as well as teachers and police officers) 
who had been in contact with Daniel and his family in the months leading up to his death 
missed 26 opportunities to help Daniel and to act in a way that would have prevented his 
death. 
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Because the SCR blames a) individuals for b) failing to behave in certain ways, the lessons it 
draws are about the ways those individuals should have behaved. In this case the SCR ties 
differences in behavior to differences in attitude towards available evidence. Lesson 15.4 for 
instance states: “Domestic abuse/violence is always a child protection issue and must al-
ways be approached with this as the mind-set of professionals.”  
 
Lesson 15.13 is: “Professional optimism about a family and of their potential to change or 
improve their parenting must be supported by objective evidence and that any contra indi-
cators have been fully considered prior to any optimistic stance being taken.”  
These make it sound as if the social workers, teachers, doctors, and police officers involved 
looked at the evidence with rose-colored glasses, which I do not think the evidence re-
viewed in the SCR supports. This seems to be the view of Eileen Munro as well from her 
comment in a public interview that she can’t claim she would have done better on the evi-
dence presented in the SCR report.   
In the same vein, the SCR (p. 6) castigates the professionals involved along these lines: 
In this case, professionals needed to “think the unthinkable” and to believe and act 
upon what they saw in front of them, rather than accept parental versions of what 
was happening at home without robust challenge. Much of the detail which 
emerged from later witness statements and the criminal trial about the level of 
abuse which Daniel suffered was completely unknown to the professionals who 
were in contact with the family at the time. 
Blaming the professionals involved for failing to “think the unthinkable” in this way is odd. 
What “they saw in front of them” clearly wasn’t that Daniel was being abused in horrific 
ways by his parents. For instance the pediatrician was blamed for not including abuse as a 
likely diagnosis when a mother brings a child to him because she is concerned that he is los-
ing weight.  But deliberate starvation as the cause is highly improbable with lots of physical 
illnesses being more probable. The sordid details of Daniel’s abuse only emerged after a full-
blown criminal investigation which involved searching the house and the parents’ cell-
phones, which is not, as I understand it, something the Coventry social workers or even the 
police could have done at an earlier stage. These social workers, by contrast, had access to 
concrete evidence supporting the view that Daniel was not being abused  by his parents, as 
the SCR itself reports. 
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Besides the morally questionable aspects of placing heavy blame on individual social work-
ers, the way the SCR assigns blame in the Daniel Pelka case seems to suppose that the way 
to prevent harmful outcomes like Daniel’s death in the future is, to put it briefly, to turn the 
professionals involved--- who are blamed for failing to detect abuse -- into better and better 
detectors of abuse, where ‘better’ means ‘fewer false negatives’ (and correlatively more 
false positives, with more families subjected to nasty investigations and sometimes losing 
their children at a lower level of evidence). From the evidence in the SCR itself, the Daniel 
Pelka case has the earmarks of a systems issue since it is the result of many minor flaws in 
practice plus the basic incompleteness of information rather than one devastating individual 
act. Each failure of each individual was just one of many ingredients in the causal cake that 
led to the failure to see how much danger Daniel was in. So it is not obvious that improving 
the ‘detectors of abuse’ in that system is the best way to improve child welfare and reduce 
the probability of Daniel-level abuse occurring again. Perhaps the better place to devote our 
attentions is to redesigning the system so it is easier to do it right and harder to do it wrong.   
That discussion recall was all in the context of worries about linear models of causation. 
My final worry about trusting that good objective methods can deliver high degrees of cer-
tainty is that these methods only deliver answers in the language in which we ask our ques-
tions, and that is often not the language in which the system under study operates. So very 
often we don’t know what we are testing with these methods. In one sense, we do; we 
know all too well, and that is the problem. Our best objective methods for testing causal 
claims, like RCTs, require a precise characterization of both the cause and the effect. This is 
a crucial part of the study protocol. We must ensure that everyone in the treatment group 
gets the same treatment, and that there are strict criteria for deciding whether the effect 
has occurred. Otherwise the validity of the conclusion is impugned. This in turn means that 
treatment and effect descriptions are couched in concrete operational terms.  
There’s the rub. For policy prediction we need causal principles that hold widely – at least 
widely enough to cover both the study situation and the target. But these kinds of principles 
often relate not concrete concepts of the kind operationalized in a good study, but far more 
abstract ones, like the concepts of ‘lever’ and ‘pulley’ that matter in my Rube Goldberg pen-
cil sharpener. This kind of problem looms large for social policy because the same thing 
doesn’t mean the same in different social settings.  
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Consider the Integrated Nutrition Program that provides nutrition education to mothers to 
improve the health of their infants. This program was a success in Tamil Nadu. But not in 
Bangladesh. According to the World Bank post hoc analysis, that’s because in many rural 
Bangladeshi households men do the shopping, not the mother, and the mother-in-law is in 
charge of food distribution.  
There was a generalizable cause producing improved infant health in Tamil Nadu.  
 
The generalizable cause was  the nutritional education of a person  
 
5.who is responsible for household food selection, and  
6.who is responsible for food distribution, and  
7.who holds the infant’s welfare paramount in carrying out these responsibilities.  
The Tamil Nadu study asked about mothers. And in Tamil Nadu the description ‘mothers’ 
does pick out a class of people with the requisite characteristics to improve infant health via 
nutritional education. But not in Bangladesh. If we wanted more generalizable results, we 
were asking the wrong question. 
Let me begin now to tie matters together. I have been criticizing three mistaken, mutually 
supporting philosophical stances that contribute to bad policy decisions.  
 
1. We take causal relations to be linear and god-given and do not tend sufficiently to 
the underlying systems that make these relations possible.  
2. We do not trust the kind of open, mullti-method, theory-infested scientific inves-
tigations it takes to uncover the structures of these underlying systems but prefer 
‘objective’ policeable methods, like randomized controlled trials, that deliver only 
surface relations.  
3. We bank on certainty. 
My mother maintained that a little learning is a dangerous thing. That’s what we see here. It 
has come even to be encoded in our language, in a familiar expression now used every-
where from newspapers reports to private conversations to policy deliberations: 'Studies 
show...' 
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But studies show very little.  No matter how good a study is, it can only deliver facts about 
the very population studied. To go beyond the boundaries of the population enrolled in the 
study it takes theory, and to have warrant for doing so, it takes good, well-supported theo-
ry. There’s no getting round that. Sometimes we seem to act as if we believe in induction by 
simple enumeration: Swan 1 is white, swan 2 is white…, so all swans are white. Study popu-
lation 1 does x, study population 2 does x...., so all populations do x. But with the additional 
drawback that we would usually be generalizing from a very small inductive base indeed, 
not tens of thousands of white British swans but 1 or 2 studies, or in the best of cases, a 
handful. And we all know what happens as soon as we move from Britain to Australia. 
 
It is as if we have forgotten the lessons about simple induction that have been rehearsed 
generation after generation for eons. Recall Bertrand Russell’s chicken. She infers, on very 
good basis, that when the farmer comes in the morning, he feeds her. That inference serves 
her well till Christmas morning when he chops off her head for Christmas dinner. Of course 
the chicken did not base her inference on a randomized controlled trial. But had we con-
ducted one we would have obtained exactly the same results. Her problem was not her 
study design but rather that she was studying surface relations. She did not understand the 
underlying socio-economic system that gave rise to the causal relations she observed. We 
often act as if the methods of investigation that served the chicken so badly will do perfectly 
well for us.  
For purposes of thinking about policy prediction and evaluation it is important to distinguish 
three distinct kinds of causal claims: 
 
[1] It works somewhere. 
This is the kind of claim we can clinch with objective methods like RCTs; it is the kind 
of verdict that a good post hoc evaluation can deliver.  
 
[2] It works.  
I take it this very popular expression must mean ‘It works almost everywhere’, or at 
least ‘widely’, or perhaps ‘everywhere, other things being equal’. 
 
[3] It will work here. 
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This is what we want to know when we deliberate about whether to adopt a policy. 
 
[1] is a good long way off from [2] or [3]; and in a very great many cases here is not relevant 
at all to there, either because here lacks the requisite support factors for the policy to work 
or because here and there have different underlying systems at work.  
You may think my distinctions are obvious and ones we are not likely to lose sight of in poli-
cy deliberations. But not so.  Let me illustrate with an example from a paper by Esther Duflo 
and Michael Kremer, who are part of a team of brilliant and dedicated development econ-
omists at the heart and core of JPAL, the MIT-centred Jamil Poverty Action Lab, and avid ad-
vocates of RCTs. Already in line 5 in one single sentence all three kinds of claims are mixed 
together.  
 
The benefits of knowing which programs work…extend far beyond any program or 
agency, and credible impact evaluations… can offer reliable guidance to international 
organizations, governments, donors, and…NGO’s beyond national borders.1 
I take it from the language and use that they mean: 
1. Which programs work =  it works (‘in general’) 
2. Impact evaluation = it works somewhere 
3. Reliable guidance = it will work for us. 
Here Duflo and Kremer slide seamlessly between ‘It works there’, ‘It works’ and ‘It will work 
here’. That’s loose talk, and loose talk in proper academic settings where we are meant to 
subscribe to high scientific standards.  
Exactly the same kind of slide occurs throughout evidence-based policy.  To get policies that 
work here, we are urged to use policies ‘that work’.  That is okay, supposing ‘It works’ 
means ‘It works widely’. If a policy does work widely, in particular widely enough to cover 
here, then trivially it works here. The trouble is that the standards for ‘It works’ are not 
those for establishing a solid general claim, and one using the concepts that such claims re-
quire. The standards are generally just that the policy, as described in the study protocol, 
has been shown to work in some study, or for highly-ranked policies, in a handful of studies.  
                                                 
1
  [Use of Randomization in the Evaluation of Development Effectiveness p 93] 
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The injunction to use ‘What works’ is endemic, from health to crime and justice systems, to 
child welfare, to education, to development economics. And the recommended standards 
for good evidence for what works are essentially the same across all these areas. And they 
all share the same deep problem: they are fine standards for justifying that a policy works 
somewhere but not for showing ‘It works’ let alone ‘It will work here’.  
Before my very brief conclusion I should like to recall where we started.  I began with some 
policy prescriptions that may be all right but that certainly call for moral scrutiny. I worry 
that these prescriptions get false support from a set of dodgy views about certainty, objec-
tivity and causality. At the close we have seen that these in turn are supported by the illicit 
conflation of distinct kinds of causal claims.  
To say, as Duflo does – and many others as well – that either randomized controlled trials or 
randomized field experiments ‘identify’ programs that ‘can alleviate poverty’ is loose talk, 
conflating different kinds of causal claims and giving a false sense of certainty and a false 
pride that our predictions are objective. The same thing happens in child welfare, in crime 
prevention, education, drug abuse,…  We cannot afford to indulge in loose talk. We need to 
be clear exactly what it takes to provide reasonable confidence about our policy predictions. 
Otherwise we bank too much on the result; we can let our optimism about policy outcomes 
outweigh our moral concerns; and disastrous consequences can ensue.  
I have then just one sentence in conclusion. Now as then we must take seriously the World 
War II warning,  ‘Loose talk can cost lives.’ 
 
 
 
